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ABSTRACT 
 
THE STATE AND CORPORATISM - The role of the state in the development and reproduction of 
“the Danish model” 
 
In the literature on the establishment and development of the Danish variant of corporatism, 
emphasis has most often been on the role of the social partners. Scholars rarely stress the crucial 
role which the state has played in the development of the system. We argue that several actors 
contributed to the development of the ‘Danish model’, but that these actors were often orchestrated 
by the state. At crucial moments the direction of these different actors was even determined by the 
state. In the first part of the article, it is argued that the state has been under-theorized and to some 
extent neglected in corporatist theory. In particular, we draw upon a conceptualization of the state 
developed by Michael Mann and Eric Nordlinger’s different forms of state autonomy. We propose a 
state-centered theoretical focus enabling us to grasp the role of the state in the dynamics of the 
corporatist system. In the second part of the article, we present an analysis of the establishment and 
evolution of the Danish corporatist system seen from this distinctively state-centered perspective. In 
the third part we look into the current system during the last decade of the 20th century. By newly- 
conducted empirical research, we examine the role of the state in the corporatist system during the 
1990s in the labour market and within immigration integration policy. We conclude that due to its 
autonomous power, the state is still a key player in the corporatist system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Since the 1990s Denmark has often been described as a successful example of a welfare state with 
an ability to adapt to new conditions of existence brought about by the new global economy.i Key 
economic figures have proved that Denmark has performed well during the last decade. Often it has 
been asked how Denmark has managed to change a poor economy in the 1970s and 1980s into a 
successful enterprise in the last 10-15 years. When trying to explain the socio-economic success in 
Denmark, observers point to ‘the Danish model’, where the social partners – especially the labour 
market parties – have a profound say in policy-making. This has been described as cooperative 
adaptation (Jørgensen 2002), which “(…) implies an ability among actors and institutions to react in 
a stabilizing manner to ensure that important elements in the welfare system survive.”(Jørgensen 
2002:240). This description follows the vast literature on Denmark and other corporatist countries, 
where corporatist relations are pointed to as the explanation for socio-economic success (see 
Katzenstein 1985; Lijphardt & Crepaz 1991; Visser & Hemerijck 1997; Due et.al. 1993).  
 The specific set of institutions and institutional practices which can be characterized 
as particularly ‘Danish’ and successful in handling socio-economic challenges have a long history, 
and they create a certain framework for coping with current challenges. We argue that the 
establishment and development of the Danish variant of effective corporatism has not primarily 
been driven by the social partners as a number of scholars on Danish corporatism seem to suggest 
(c.f. Due et. al 1993, Jørgensen 2002); neither has its development been entirely due to the 
smallness and openness of the economy as, for example, Katzenstein suggests (Katzenstein 1985). 
Instead we will bring to the fore the crucial role the Danish state has played in the development and 
reproduction of the corporative system. We shall argue that several actors contributed intentionally 
and unintentionally to the development of the ‘Danish model’, but that these actors were often 
orchestrated by the state, and at crucial moments even determined by the state.ii Such an argument 
requires a stronger conceptual understanding of the state. Thus, if we want to understand the 
historical development and the dynamics of the Danish model we need to incorporate the state-as-
an-actor and an active player as an important variable.  
 In the first part of the article we argue that the state has been under-theorized and to 
some extent neglected in corporatist theory. The society-centred focus originally suggested by 
scholars such as Schmitter (1974), Lembruch (1984) and Katzenstein (1985) has biased the analyses 
leading to an inadequate analytical treatment of the state as an autonomous actor. We shall draw 
upon various forms of state theories in particular from historical sociology. We propose a state-
centered theoretical focus enabling us to grasp the role of the state in the dynamics of the corporatist 
system. In the second part we present a historical analysis of the complexities of the establishment 
and evolution of the Danish corporatist system seen from this distinctively state-centered 
perspective. In the third part we evaluate the development of the Danish model in the last part of the 
20th century. We examine the role of the state in the corporatist system on the labour market as an 
example of an old policy area, and on immigration integration policy as an example of a relatively 
new policy area. 
 
The theoretical framework  
While much theoretical and empirical effort has been put into discussing and evaluating the 
outcomes of corporatist policy making, less effort has been reserved for examining the complex 
processes of interaction that drive the dynamics. In particular, the role of the state in this process is 
somewhat undeveloped (Torfing 1995:9).  It is not until the mid-1980s that serious attempts are 
made to develop a more state-centered perspective on corporatist policy-making (Hemerijck and 
Vail 2005:5). Colin Crouch’s analysis of how historical contingencies of state traditions has had 
consequences for the organization and shaping of civil society and interest intermediation stands out 
as one of the clearest examples of this approach (Crouch 1993). He argues that the state plays 
important roles not only in constructing the corporatist framework but also in the continuous 
political exchange within this framework, which the state facilitates by using either side payments 
or threats of bypassing corporatist institutions. This implies that the state is deeply and continuously 
involved in regulating corporatist policy-making. Crouch describes the dynamic between the 
corporatist state and societal partners as a “sharing of political space” (Crouch 1993:50ff), thereby 
pointing to a complex reciprocal relationship between the state and organized interests, leaving 
neither with complete power: the determinants of the dynamics of corporatist governance must 
therefore be found in the interplay between state and interest groups.  
 In this perspective the state is implicitly regarded as an actor which is capable of 
conducting relatively autonomous actions. However, the question of autonomy seems rather 
undeveloped. Is it fair to argue that the state acts autonomously? How and under what conditions 
does the state frame and facilitate corporatist exchange? When does it use side payments and when 
does it use threats of bypassing corporatist institutions? Answers to these questions remain 
unanswered by Crouch’s approach. Other scholars have followed in the footsteps of Crouch 
(notably Visser & Hemmerijck 1997; Hemerijck & Vail 2005). Following along the same lines as 
Crouch, Visser & Hemmerijck’s analysis of the Dutch miracle (Visser & Hemmerijck 1997) shows 
how the state in some cases can be a “shadow of hierarchy”, as was the case in Dutch labour market 
policy (Visser & Hemmerijck 1997:81ff). Hemmerijck & Vail argue that the capacity of the state is 
central when comparing the dynamics of German and Dutch corporatism (Hemerijck & Vail 
2005:42-47). As was the case with Crouch’s contribution, one must appreciate the sensitivity to the 
role played by the state. However, questions surrounding the characteristics of state autonomy still 
remain unanswered.  
 Here we have to turn to other sources. The problem of autonomy and the state-society 
relation has been discussed within various traditions of state theory. A number of scholars have 
argued that the state is not only relatively autonomous, but in certain situations entirely 
autonomous. This view is mainly advocated by historical sociologists such as Theda Skocpol, 
Charles Tilly, and Michael Mann. In this context we shall draw upon Mann’s work. The state and 
the autonomy of the state are central in Mann’s works (e.g Mann 1977; 1984; 1986; 1988; 1992). 
Mann’s project attempts to break with the reductionism characterizing liberalistic, Marxist, and 
functionalist theories, in which the state is reduced to pre-existing structures in civil society. The 
state responds to two kinds of interests/pressures (both internal and external), generating a particular 
autonomous “space” where the state-elite may manoeuvre and play the classes off against each 
other. The dual conception of the state is conceived as a step away from reductionism. Mann, 
however, suggests a further radicalization in order to avoid reductionism. The state is only an arena 
- a space - and this is the source of the autonomy of the state. Broadly, Mann subscribes to a 
Weberian point of departure for an understanding of the state (Mann 1988:4). This includes four 
parts: 
 
- A differentiated set of institutions and staff, forming 
- centrality, defined as political relations, radiating outwards from a center to cover 
- a territorially-demarcated area, over which is exercised 
- a monopoly of authoritatively binding rule making, backed up by a monopoly of physical means 
of violence. 
 
To Mann, an essential element is the centralized institutions of the state containing a high level of 
power possessed by the state elite. The power of the state elite and the centralized institutions has 
two dimensions. One is called despotic power, which is the direct potential and range of action of 
the state elite. Actions may be carried out without any kind of routine negotiations with groups in 
civil society (Mann 1993:59). The other kind of power is infrastructural power, which is the 
capacity of the state to penetrate civil society and to implement political decisions within a given 
territory.  Infrastructural power has made it increasingly possible for states to subordinate the 
everyday life of the population with extended levels of control and surveillance. It is this form of 
power that dominates modern capitalist democracies (Mann 1993:59). 
 The possession of despotic and infrastructural power lends autonomy to the state. This 
power and autonomy have their origins in three conditions: 1) the necessity of the state, 2) the 
multiplicity of the functions of the state, and 3) the territorial centralization of the state. Concerning 
the necessity of the state, Mann takes his point of departure from a Hobbesian conception of 
society. The existence of a society is conditioned by the presence of rules that are capable of 
protecting life and property. These rules originate from a monopoly. Moreover, it is said that states 
always exist in a system of states, which also imposes certain rules of behaviour onto each state. 
The autonomous power of the state proceeds from this necessity - “necessity is the mother of state 
power” (Mann 1984: 196). 
  Mann claims that the state has several functions. The state as a “binding rule-making 
authority” covers several areas, each of which are functional with respect to different areas within 
society. These are divided into four main categories: 
 
- The maintenance of internal order. 
- Military attack/aggression. The external functions of the state. 
- The maintenance of infrastructure (of communication). For example roads, rivers, coinage, 
weights and measures, and messaging systems. 
- Economic redistribution. An authoritative distribution of scarce material resources between 
various age groups, sexes, regions, classes, etc. Moreover, there is also an international 
element, since it is the state that regulates the relations of trade and currency exchange along 
the borders. 
 
These four kinds of tasks are undertaken by the state. Thus the state has several functional relations 
with various groups. The state’s room for manoeuvre exists between all these different groups, and 
this space can be used to play off the various groups against each other. Mann’s conclusion is that 
this room for manoeuvre is the birthplace of state power. But this insight does not capture the 
distinctiveness of the state as a social organization. As can be seen in the definition of the state 
given above, the state’s institutional centralized and territorial nature is included as an element. This 
particular element is the precondition of the unique autonomous power of the state. Only the state 
has a particular inherent centralized authoritative power over a specific territory. In contrast to 
economic, ideological and military groups in civil society, the resources of the state elite radiate 
authoritatively outwards from a centre, only coming to a halt at a territorially defined border. “The 
state is, indeed, a place - both a central place and a unified territorial reach” (ibid:198). More 
precisely, this property distinguishes the state from other powerful societal groups such as 
businesses, capital owners, interest organizations, the Church or the nobility. The autonomous 
power of the state proceeds precisely from the difference in the organizational structure and socio-
spatial conditions. “Territorial centralization provides the state with a potentially independent basis 
of power mobilization being necessary to social development and uniquely in the possession of the 
state itself” (ibid.:201). The autonomy of the state therefore consists of its necessity, the plurality of 
functions and territorial centralization. The power of the state elite cannot be reduced to the power 
of any group and it is therefore autonomous in relation to civil society. Thus, by bringing Mann’s 
work into our framework we have established the autonomous character of the state. 
 Moving further towards a more differentiated concept of autonomy, Eric A. 
Nordlinger presents a rather different analytical perspective to the state compared to Mann. 
Nordlinger stresses that the state must be conceived not only as an organizational apparatus but also 
– and maybe more importantly – as a collective of persons with special authority.iii These persons 
have the right to make decisions that are binding for all of society (Nordlinger 1981:11). Nordlinger 
constructs state autonomy as a variable by introducing three types of stately autonomy which can be 
exercised by the state under different kinds of conditions of state-society relationsiv. The first type 
of autonomy describes a situation where the state deliberately disregards the interests of other 
groups – e.g. the labour unions, employer federations etc. (Nordlinger 1981:118ff). Here the state 
will only succeed if it possesses what Mann characterized as despotic power. The second type 
describes a situation where the state tries to sway the preferences of, for example, interest 
organizations, using political leadership and manipulation in order to arrive at a compromise which 
will serve the interests of the state. (Nordlinger 1981:99ff). Finally, the third type describes a 
situation where the state invites interest groups into the decision-making process in return for a 
commitment to supporting the implementation of the final decisions (Nordlinger 1981:74ff). We 
might describe the last strategy as a kind of give and take system where interest groups forego some 
of their political freedom and in return receive a privileged position in the political process. 
Nordlinger’s last strategy does in many ways resemble descriptions of corporatist relations between 
state and organized interests. We could argue that by approaching a corporatist decision-making 
system from the perspectives provided by Mann and Nordlinger, we are able to capture the complex 
reciprocal relationship between the state and interest organizations without losing sight of the 
autonomous powers of the state as represented by the first two strategies provided by Nordlinger. 
Thus, by introducing Mann and Nordlinger, we are able partly to establish the argument for the 
autonomy of the state in state-centered corporatist theory, and partly to provide a specification of 
various forms of autonomy. 
  
The development of the Danish corporatist state and the effective corporatist system 
It is beyond the scope of this article to give a more comprehensive exposition of the Danish variant 
of effective corporatism. Several other scholars have contributed to the overview and explanation of 
Danish development (see Jørgensen 2002; Due & Madsen 1993, Campbell, Hall, & Pedersen 2006). 
Instead, we will concentrate on the role of the state in the Danish corporatist system. This 
perspective requires a historical sociological analysis of the Danish state formation process. We 
cannot provide such an analysis here, but some important aspects of the Danish state formation 
process will be our point of departure.v  
 The Danish state evolved through a particular combination of despotic and 
infrastructural power, which facilitated a specific variant of corporatism. The Danish state 
formation process was long, but in 1660 fundamental changes occurred when a stände staat was 
replaced by a more demarcated, territorial and centralized absolutist state. The 1660 regime change 
was a crucial ‘critical juncture’ which transformed the Danish state and facilitated the development 
of a modern society. This society (market and civil) may be described as being ‘fully fledged’ with 
the advent of the liberal-democratic Constitution (June 1849) and the Freedom of Trade Act (1857).  
 1864 is another critical juncture in the Danish state formation process and arguably 
more important to the development of corporatism. In 1864 Denmark suffered a defeat to Prussia 
and this led to a set of changes which included a revision of the constitution, political changes with 
a strengthening of the conservative forces, and also a loss of fertile land and one third of the 
population. Moreover, it paved the way for a strong popular nationalism. A huge part of nationalist 
emotions was distributed among popular social movements - in the beginning primarily in the 
farmers’ associations, but later also in the small holders and the labour movement. Associationalism 
was reinforced by popular nationalism partly as popular opposition to the conservative ruling class, 
and partly as a national response to the new conditions of existence after the defeat.  
 The strong wave of associationalism had already started in the 1850s and 1860s. 
These decades are called the ‘age of associationalism’ in Denmark (Hvidt 1990:95). The many 
associations founded in the 1850s and in the following decades were very much in opposition to the 
ruling elite and class – the landowners and the urban elite. In particular, the farmers formed a large 
number of associations aimed at improving their economic situation by creating small local saving 
banks and insurance companies, for example (Hvidt 1990:94-96). The state approved because it 
could see the benefits when the population organized and educated themselves in these associations. 
The Danish state supported many initiatives financially, and the principle of ‘help-to-self-help’. It 
was a sophisticated way of governing and it is an extension of the infrastructural power capacity of 
the state. By indirect control of the development of important activities the state could strengthen its 
own resource base, while the local actors were responsible for the organization and the daily 
business of the activities, whether local saving banks, a sick-club or adult education.  
 
Further corporatism 
Some other developments facilitated the emergence of the ‘organizational society’ and the effective 
democratic corporatist system. The political processes after the defeat to Prussia brought about a 
peculiar situation in which the state and the political elite – Prime Minister J.B.S. Estrup, the Right 
and civil servants in particular – appeared to be strong and weak at the same time. The Conservative 
government outplayed the opposition. In 1875-94. Prime Minister Estrup managed to keep the 
opposition - despite its majority in the Folketing (the House of Commons) - out of influence by 
governing through provisional finance acts. Through Estrup’s use of provisional acts, the state 
appeared as a strong entity wielding much despotic power. It follows from Nordlinger’s 
differentiation of autonomy that the state during the Estrup-years deliberately disregarded the 
interests of other groups.  
 Daily politics was characterized by a policy of obstruction from the Left which was, 
however, too weak to effect a change in the system. Therefore, daily politics became a matter for 
interest groups and voluntary associations. The farmers’ movement played an important role, as did 
the associations in towns and cities related to the new labour market emerging as a consequence of 
industrialization and urbanization. A strong political force from below contributed to shaping 
Danish society during the second half of the 19th century when the parliamentary system was at a 
stalemate. The apparently strong but passive state facilitated the growth of voluntary associations, 
both by providing the legal framework and by acting so passively that a space was left open for 
other actors. The voluntary association was used in this space as a means of organizing class 
interest into class conflict. The character of class conflict changed during this period. In the 1860s 
and 70s the main dispute was between farmers and the landowners, but during the 1880s and 1890s 
capital-labour emerged as a new conflict dimension.  
 Several interrelated social and political processes merged in Denmark during the 
1860s, 70s, 80s and 90s. The development of voluntary associations and their relationship with the 
state have already been mentioned. The liberal-democratic constitution gave an impetus to the 
development of voluntary associations because their formation was stated as a right in the 
constitution. Moreover, the 1849 Constitution and The Freedom of Trade Act (1857) destroyed the 
last remnants of the medieval guild structure. The guilds were, however, of major importance for a 
number of people living in towns and cities. For centuries masters, craftsmen, journeymen, and 
apprentices were organized in guilds: as well as the knowledge transfer and the learning processes 
which this involved, the guilds also functioned as a social welfare provider by giving some security 
in terms of sick pay, poverty aid and pensions. The relationship between master and journeymen 
and between journeyman and apprentice was also regulated by the guilds. These forms of security 
disappeared with the formal abolition of the guilds. Some guilds continued to function in a 
reconstructed form as new voluntary associations. In Copenhagen, in particular, these associations 
developed and at times took on the role as functioning as an employer association. Some guilds 
dominated by journeymen evolved into sick- and funeral clubs. Some also functioned as an 
emergent form of a trade union, organizing strikes and forcefully compelling the employers to 
accept the need for increases in wages (Rerup 1989:48). In other words, the combination of the right 
to form voluntary associations and the need to replace the guilds with new organizations influenced 
the development of a corporatist structure.  
So far we have explained the reasons for voluntary associations assuming importance; 
but why did they become influential in the official political system? With the new liberal 
constitution in 1849, the old estate (stände) system broke down and interests were now thought to 
be represented by individuals in the parliament. This did not work. Although party formations took 
place, they were not sufficiently able to represent the interests of the market. Consequently, while 
political parties were in the process of developing, it did not take long for the organized interests in 
market and civil society to become visible. As time went by, a closer connection evolved between, 
on the one hand, the associational structure and the organized interests in the market and, on the 
other, the political parties in the parliament. ‘Venstre’ represented the farmers in the parliament and 
the labour movement was represented by the Social Democrats and so on. Moreover, since the Left 
(Venstre) – the farmers in particular – did not trust the Right and the conservative bureaucracy, they 
were already trying to include the voluntary associations in influencing public policy development 
before the turn of the century (Christiansen & Nørgaard 2003:40). Another dimension is related to a 
specific state tradition in which various interest groups were included in some of the public 
administration agencies during the absolutist regime. Some commissions at the municipal level 
were also established in the years after the introduction of the liberal constitution of 1849 
(Christiansen & Nørgaard 2003:41). From the 1890s onwards, organized interest groups were 
gradually included in the political and administrative decision-making process (Christiansen & 
Nørgaard 2003:42; Nørgaard 2000:193-206). In other words, the development of the infrastructural 
power dimension of the Danish state has long historical roots.  
 Finally, an answer can be provided by pointing to the state-society relationship that 
developed during the post-1864 years, in which the state supported initiatives taken by actors in 
society as part of a help-to-self-help strategy. It was a form of compromise between a strategy of 
state intervention or non-intervention. It can be seen as an outcome of the compromise first between 
the Conservative and the Left (farmers) and later between the Centre-Right and the Social 
Democrats. By recognizing the voluntary associations and in particular the prominent associations 
representing major interest groups in the market, the state reinforced the level and intensity of the 
organization of the interest groups. As an example we can point to the support given by the state to 
the unemployment system. The system was based upon a principle of voluntary participation. The 
unemployment system operated separately from the trade unions, but was administered by them; 
thus there was strong encouragement for workers to organize and become members of a union 
(Knudsen 1999:112-113).  
 The third critical juncture affecting the development of a corporatist structure of 
Danish society was World War One. Despite the fact that the country remained neutral during this 
war, it became clear that Denmark was constrained by it as much as any other country. Exports 
were threatened due to problems of blockades and mines in the seas. Therefore, the importing of 
raw materials was also disrupted. The outcome was a shortage of supplies and price increases in 
goods. The low-income social groups, in particular, suffered. This could have led to more inequality 
and social tensions. Consequently, the state adopted a new strategy to solve the problems. Massive 
state intervention and regulation proved to be the answer. This strategy was, however, based upon a 
corporative structure in which the key societal organizations representing the major social groups 
and economic interests participated (Vigen 1950: 440-469). Immediately after the war broke out, 
the Danish government with full support from the Parliament established on August 7 1914 a 
Commission with the Minister of Interior Affairs, Ove Rode, in charge. The strong support of the 
Commission indicated a truce between the otherwise conflicting parties in the Parliament. The 
Minister appointed representatives from all major organizations, interest groups and social classes 
in Denmark. The farmers, the small-holders, industry, the trade unions, the ship owners, consumers, 
the social democrats, the liberals, and science were all represented (Vigen 1950:444; Rasmussen 
1965:72). The Commission constructed an elaborate system of regulations which affected every 
economic and social area, including price policy, supply policy and rationing, and to a certain extent 
also income distribution policy. The Commission did this with considerable success. Denmark 
succeeded in coming through the war without major troubles, tensions or social conflicts.  
 The First World War is crucial to understanding corporatism in Denmark. 
Redistribution of income and welfare took place for the first time on a massive scale. Critical to this 
development is the means by which the state succeeded partly in getting support for these policies 
and partly in implementing them. The state increased its governing capacity, but so did all the major 
organizations representing the economic interest in the country. In 1899 the state had already 
recognized and accepted that the labour market was run by the employers and employees. The state 
also had some years before acknowledged the presence and importance of the other organizations, 
not least the farmers and industry. It was not until the First World War, however, that all these 
organizations were invited to take part in all sorts of commissions and committees set up by the 
government or a governmental institution. This gave them considerable influence and this process 
transformed these organizations into more stable and strongly institutionalized entities. They 
became indispensable organizations and co-responsible for the societal development in Denmark. It 
is hardly wrong to say that the First World War was a point of crystallization of the Danish model 
of ‘effective corporatism’. 
 We will now move from a general discussion of the role of the state in the emergence 
of corporatism to focus on its role in labour market corporatism. By the end of the 19th century, the 
main organizations of the labour market had been established. Employers united into the 
Employers’ Confederation of 1896, subsequently the Danish Employers’ Confederation (Dansk 
Arbejdsgiverforening, DA). The trade union movement responded a little later by forming in 1898 
the Co-operating National Trade Unions in Denmark (De samvirkende Fagforbund i Danmark, 
DsF) - known today as the National Organization in Denmark, LO (Landsorganisationen i 
Danmark), i.e. a confederation of trade unions (Due et al. 1994:76-78).  
 
Developing the Danish way of labour market corporatism 
The development of the two main organizations, Dsf (LO) and DA, indicates a distinctive trait of 
the Danish labour market structure. Through the conflicts of 1880s and 1890s, a tradition of 
negotiation emerged that was relatively free from state intervention. The state intervened only when 
the labour market parties were unable to resolve their disputes by themselves and when this resulted 
in comprehensive strikes or lockouts followed by a decrease in production (Mikkelsen 1992: 34; 
Due et al.1994: 70). Following Nordlinger’s differentiation between various forms of autonomy, the 
governance of the labour market and industrial relations in Denmark is very much a ‘give and take 
system’ in which the state facilitates a specific architecture, but much of the content is developed by 
actual negotiations between the social partners. The organizations were allowed relative autonomy 
in setting the conditions of the labour market, with minimal interference from the state. The role of 
the state was to function as guarantor of the formal rights necessary for these institutional practices 
of the labour market to develop. The legal preconditions defining the institutional development of 
the labour market were the 1849 Constitution, the Act on Freedom of Trade (Næringsloven) in 1857 
and – as we shall now discuss – the September Compromise  of 1899 (Skovgaard-Petersen 1985; 
Rerup 1989). The events that led to the signing of the September Compromise began in the spring 
of 1899. Starting out as a minor strike, the conflict escalated between the two labour market parties, 
DsF and DA, causing DA to initiate a nationwide lockout of certain trades. Following months of 
opposing demands and refusals to settle the dispute, an agreement was reached in September that 
year which granted extensive rights to both parties concerned. Most importantly, the September 
Compromise constituted recognition of the management prerogative, which was the main goal of 
the employers. Furthermore, the Compromise promoted the centralization of the labour market, 
especially the structure of negotiation, thus leaving the employers’ confederation victorious 
(Mikkelsen 1991: 8). Nonetheless, the Compromise was also a victory for the trade union 
movement because it firmly established the workers’ right to organize (Due et al. 1994: 83; Rerup 
1989: 51-54).  
 From the turn of the century, the centralized bodies, DA and DsF, conducted most 
labour market negotiations. This meant a strengthening of these central organizations at the expense 
of branch organizations, i.e. the separate trade unions and their complementary employer 
associations (Mikkelsen 1992: 55). By accepting this arrangement, the state allowed the 
associations themselves to come to an agreement that secured a stable and well-functioning labour 
market, as the activities of strike and lockout activities were considerably limited or at least 
circumscribed by rules that prevented the development of more serious conflicts. In principle the 
1899 Compromise and the following ten years bear witness to recognition of the two organizations 
by the state. The state recognizes the presence of a conflict between capital and labour. The state 
officially recognizes the right and legitimacy of the two organizations to negotiate and to control 
industrial relations. 
  Thus on one level the labour market corporatism in Denmark presents itself as a 
decision-making system requiring little state regulation. It appears self-regulating with the 
organized interests playing the dominant roles. The government, however, only respects the 
autonomy of the parties as long as the parties are able to find a compromise. Given the centrality of 
the negotiations a major breakdown will affect almost the entire labour market. In the case of a 
general strike the state, of course, has to react. Thus Danish labour market corporatism has been 
conditioned by active and continuous state regulation and intervention.  In the following paragraphs 
we will discuss some aspects of Danish labour market corporatism which place the state firmly at 
the centre of the corporatist decision-making process.  
 At the heart of labour market corporatism is the collective agreement system, a system 
mainly controlled by the labour market parties. The most distinctive characteristic of the Danish 
model of labour relations is regulation by collective agreements rather than legislation. As our 
account has shown, the relationship to the authorities is nonetheless strong. Hence, throughout the 
20th century, the state has played a decisive role in the shaping of the legal framework and 
conditions of opportunities which, again, is an example of exercising infrastructural power. In the 
aftermath of the September agreement, the procedures surrounding collective bargaining were 
unclear and needed legal specification. Only a little more than 10 years after the September 
Compromise – in 1910 - the state created the Conciliation Board as a third agent in order to 
facilitate the negotiation process between the parties. The Board was formed so that it could 
intervene in the case of a bargaining deadlock. In addition, the labour market parties were mutually 
obliged to maintain industrial peace between collective agreements. During the 1930s the 
Conciliation Board became a tangible and legally enshrined nucleus of the collective bargaining 
system. The chairman of the Conciliation Board is appointed by the government and via the “right 
of concatenation” vi, established by the Conciliation Board Act of 1934, this state body played a 
major role in solving conflicts in the labour market in the 20th century in Denmark. Emphasizing the 
role of the Conciliation Board as a government controlled conflict solver must, however, not cloud 
the fact that the resolution of conflicts in the labour market in Denmark is still primarily the 
business of the labour market parties. The Conciliation Board has mainly operated on the premises 
of the collective bargaining system and thus, indirectly, of the two parties. It has been firmly aimed 
at reaching a compromise based on the balance of power between the parties. Finally, an Industrial 
Court was set up to deal with breaches in the collective agreements (Due et al. 1994: 85-89; 
Christiansen et al. 2000: 10).  
 In other words, even though the emerging Danish model denoted a considerable 
degree of self-governance for labour and management, the state and the changing governments were 
highly influential in setting the legal framework and possibilities for their actions. In addition to this 
institutionalized intervention, a practice was established of direct state intervention in cases where 
inability to reach collective agreements caused a major industrial dispute. Quite a large number of 
conflicts in the labour market have been solved with the help of the Conciliation Board or with 
direct state intervention. In order to uphold the system the state intervened 10 times between 1934 
and 1991 and the Conciliation Board no less than 11 times (Due et al 1993:251).  
 So far we have shown how the state has been an active and crucial player in the 
development of a corporatist system, which on the surface is characterized by little state 
involvement. The special ‘model’ encompassing an influential state with social partners with a large 
degree of autonomy has led to a strong integration of these partners into the political system when it 
comes to consultation, law preparatory work and implementation policies. Thus the corporative 
system reinforced itself during the 20th century. In general it is fair to conclude that the state has 
upheld its autonomy but has also strategically exploited this autonomy to facilitate a system in 
which the state ‘invites interest groups into the decision-making process in return for a commitment 
to support the implementation of the final decisions‘ (Nordlinger 1981:74ff). We shall now examine 
whether the state has continued to play a crucial role in regulating Danish corporatism in recent 
years.    
 
Recent developments – employment and integration policy 
In this part we examine how the Danish corporatist system has coped with socio-economic 
challenges in the last decades of the 20th century, and the role the state has played in the process. 
Our conclusions are based upon an analysis of two policy areas: employment policy and 
immigration integration policy.vii These areas have been chosen because they are rooted in different 
historical and institutional settings and present different challenges to Danish politics. By 
employment policy we mean the efforts by government and the social partners to reduce 
unemployment. Employment policy is usually regarded as a policy area where corporatist ties have 
been strong and dominating. During the 1970s and 1980s Denmark experienced growing 
unemploymentviii, which became the dominant political problem in the early 1990s. Integration 
policy covers questions of how to integrate immigrants in society. The number of immigrants has 
increased in Denmark since the 1970s and this policy area has moved considerably closer to the top 
of the political agenda.  
 
Employment policy 
On the surface, employment policy in Denmark manifests all the characteristics of a genuinely 
corporatist system. We have already discussed how the recurrent rounds of wage negotiations are 
handled by the social partners. If no solution can be reached the state intervenes – a situation that 
has been far from rare in Denmark. The state, however, also holds important informal capacities 
through the civil servants’ close relationships to the labour market parties. The informal contacts 
between the National Labour Market Authority (AMS), LO and DA are extensive, and prior to 
every meeting in the National Employment Councilix the Secretary of the Council (a civil servant) 
contacts representatives of LO and DA to discuss any controversial subjects on the agenda. Helle 
Svendsen, Secretary of the Employment Council, says: “It is my job to ensure that the level of 
conflict in the Council does not become too high” One of her greatest assets in this process is her 
exhaustive knowledge of subjects and policy changes which may prove to be controversial for the 
social partners. In cases where either LO’s or DA’s interests are compromised, the civil servants 
will always afterwards try to repair the relationship with possible side payments. Helle Svendsen 
continues: “It is very much a system of give and take. It is very often the case that they (the interest 
organizations) say: ‘All right, you (the Ministry) get this but then we want something in return’. 
You cannot use them to achieve political legitimacy without giving them something in return”. 
Also, LO and DA are well aware that taking part in the corporatist game sometimes means 
accepting suffering losses. Ole Krog, director in Danish Industry says: “In some cases the 
Government can choose to run right over the interest organizations and pursue its own specific 
policy goals”. But both civil servants and representatives of the organized interests also know that 
the corporatist game of give and take only functions if all parties are able to accept defeats without 
jeopardizing the system.   
 A labour market reform initiated in 1993 is often singled out as the most important 
implemented policy resulting in the quite impressive drop in unemployment that Denmark has 
experienced since the early 1990s. The reform is also presented as a strong example of how the 
social partners were able to handle the socio-economic challenges posed by unemployment 
(Jørgensen, 2002). However, here we argue that the process leading up to the implementation of the 
reform and later moderations of it cannot be fully understood without taking into account the active 
role played by the state. The reform was based on extensive research work undertaken by the 
Zeuthen Committee, which included all relevant labour market parties. However, if we dig deeper 
and analyze how the actual work within the Committee was carried out, we find the influence of the 
Government and the central administration in the Committee to be quite strikingx. Formally, the 
Government was not part of the Committee and participated only as Secretariat. However, it exerted 
strong influence on the work of the Committee because it prepared the major part of the technical 
analyses. The government’s main reason for establishing the Committee was to find a way to 
control the growing expense of employment benefitsxi. The Government knew it would have a hard 
time convincing LO of the need for this kind of reform, but without it the Government’s power base 
in Parliament, which depended on the support of the small social liberal party – de Radikale – 
would be in jeopardy. The strategy of the leader of the Secretariat, Jørgen Rosted, was to convince 
LO of the need to restrict expenditure on employment benefits and in return establish generous 
activation schemes as compensation or side payments to LO, thereby securing their support for the 
reform even though it worsened the conditions for LO’s own membersxii.  
 We argue that the case of the Zeuthen Committee is an example of how the state 
exercised its autonomy in the corporatist policy-making system and exerted considerable influence 
on the conclusions of the work of the Committee. The state was instrumental in producing and 
facilitating the compromises that needed to be found and it was able to sway LO, in particular, 
towards the outcome it preferred by using side payments in the form of the establishment of new 
activation schemes which benefited LO’s members. Thus we argue that Nordlinger’s second and 
third type of autonomy was used in the process leading up to the labour market reform. Since 
around 1995 the state has been more reluctant to include the parties in modifications of the labour 
market reform. These modifications have to a large extent been determined during the yearly budget 
negotiations. Civil servant boards were assigned to design the policy proposals (Winther, 
2003:298f). One could argue that the state’s policy of autonomy has changed during the 1990s 
towards the first of Nordlinger’s strategies.  
 
Integration policy  
Up until the late 1980s, integration policy was largely absent from the political agenda. During the 
1990s, and as a consequence of a general change in the population’s perception of immigrants 
towards a more critical stance, integration policy became “high politics” in Denmark. In early 1998 
polls showed that 47 percent of the Danish population regarded immigration/integration policy as 
the biggest problem for the country. The political result was the presence in Parliament of the 
Danish People’s Party (a protest party very critical towards immigration), who won 7.4 per cent of 
the votes in the 1998 election.  
 The role of the state also changed quite dramatically during the 1990s. Before the 
1998 integration law came into force, integration schemes were carried out by a non-governmental 
organization, the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), and the relatively small scope of the task 
combined with little political interest provided for an arena with very little political conflict. 
However, when problems regarding integration started to appear in the mid-1990s, the social 
democratic Minister of Domestic Affairs, Birthe Weiss, decided to set up an “integration 
committee” with the task of analyzing existing rules and regulations and of proposing a tentative 
formulation for a new integration law (Indenrigsministeriet, 1997). The members of the Committee 
were representatives from a number of relevant ministries and organizations (including the labour 
market parties, DRC, Local Government Denmark (LG)xiii and a number of representatives from 
immigrant organizations). In that sense the formative period of policy-making in the area of 
integration followed the traditions of Danish corporatism. The Committee published its conclusions 
and recommendations in May 1997. In 1998 the first integration law in Danish history was passed.  
 The contents of the law, however, looked very different from the recommendations 
given by the Committee. The Government had decided to ignore central parts of the Committee’s 
recommendations. The Committee recommended that the final responsibility for integration and, 
more importantly, for the distribution of immigrants among municipalities should remain with 
DRC. However, the Government needed to divert final responsibility away from DRC in order to 
implement a new distribution of refugees among municipalities in Denmarkxiv (Clausen & 
Hovmand, 2001:53). This amendment was necessary to silence the growing criticism of the 
Government’s integration policy coming even from the Government parties’ own rank-and-file – 
especially among social democrats. DRC was not an authority and DRC could not and would not 
force any municipality to receive a larger number of refugees.  
 Also, the feeling in DRC was that the growing integration task was becoming too 
large for them to handle without jeopardizing their self-perception as a non-governmental 
organization. DRC Secretary General Andreas Kamm says: “At that time it seemed relevant to ask 
whether a task of this magnitude should be handled by the state or an NGO. And there were a 
number of good reasons to answer that it should be handled by the state because ultimately the 
citizens are the responsibility of the state.”  
 Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen’s decision to appoint a new Minister of 
Domestic Affairs in 1997 - Thorkil Simonsen; a former mayor and former president of Local 
Government Denmark and regarded in the public as more of a hard-liner on integration issues than 
his predecessor – was the first part of the strategy. The second part, the decision to move final 
responsibility from DRC to the municipalities, resulted in a lot of criticism from immigrant 
organizations, who didn’t want immigrants to be forced to move to new places around the country. 
LG was also critical because they did not want to see any of their members being forced to accept a 
larger number of immigrants and refugees. In the negotiations leading up to the final passing of the 
new integration law, the feeling among representatives from LG was that they had been given little 
choice but to accept the Government’s decision because it was supported by almost all political 
parties in Parliament. Birgit Hedegård, chief of section in LG, says: “We thought that if the social 
democrats, the liberals and the conservatives all have this position (that the municipalities should 
take over responsibility), it would probably be better to play along and influence the process instead 
of insisting on a voluntary solution.”   
 Today decisions regarding integration policy are made through close cooperation 
between the state and LG. The municipalities are the sole responsible authority for implementing 
policies in the area and LG is therefore the central player.  
This development has stripped the immigrant organizationsxv of any influence they 
had earlier on. When we discussed this issue with civil servants in the Ministry for Refugees, 
Immigration and Integration Affairs, they all regretted that no central immigrant organization has 
developed that can carry the views of the immigrant groups forward. Permanent Undersecretary 
Martin Isenbech says: “We try to include them (immigrant organizations), but it is hard to find out 
who to talk with. Sometimes I find it hard to know who is actually representing whom”. The 
problem is that no immigrant organization has developed that can deliver what the Ministry is 
demanding: legitimacy and help in implementing the Ministry’s policies. In other words, the 
immigrant organizations are not able to “play the corporatist game”. And when the Ministry finds 
that these organizations cannot ultimately deliver the expected support to a specific proposal, the 
corporatist “give and take” system breaks down. The (now former) Permanent Secretary, Niels 
Preisler, from the Ministry for Refugees, Immigration and Integration Affairs, says about the 
immigrant organizations: “It seems like they feel it is their function to say no and always be 
discontented. It is, of course, their right, but it doesn’t get us anywhere”.  
 The case of the integration law and integration policy in general is illustrative in 
showing how the role of the state and the exercise of autonomous power of the state can change 
over time. From being almost absent in the arena until the early 1990s, the state has acted very 
autonomously from the mid-1990s onwards. Towards the immigrant organizations the state acted in 
a way consistent with Nordlinger’s first autonomy strategy. In the case of LG it was a mix of the 
second and third strategies. The state certainly tried to sway LG to accept the reform, but it also 
applied rather generous side payments to the municipalities in the form of new and large state 
subsidies.  
 
Conclusion 
Traditional corporatist theory neglects the importance of the state in the establishment and 
development of effective corporatism. By analyzing the origin and development of the Danish 
effective corporatist system, we have demonstrated the crucial role the state is playing in the 
corporatist system – a role which goes beyond just being a shadow behind the scenes of the social 
partners.  
 In this article we have argued that several actors have been and still are active in the 
development of the ‘Danish model’, but that these actors are often orchestrated by the state; indeed, 
at key moments the direction of these different actors is even determined by the state. Thus, it is 
crucial to understand the role of the state-as-an-actor if we want to comprehend fully the historical 
development and the dynamics of the Danish model. Theoretically, our analysis is underpinned by 
the work by Michael Mann and his conceptualization of the state as an autonomous actor resulting 
from the necessity of the state, the multiplicity of the functions of the state, and the territorial 
centralization of the state. These three properties are the defining dimension of the autonomous 
state and no other type of organization carries them. In order to specify the specific character of the 
autonomy of the state, we have been inspired by Nordlinger’s work. 
 The historical analysis shows how the state has been an active player both in terms of 
providing a legal framework for corporate arrangements and by creating institutions like the 
Conciliation Board and the Industrial Court in the labour market. Moreover, we see that the state 
has not hesitated to intervene when agreements between the parties could not be reached. We see 
how the capacity of using infrastructural power is increasing over the years, but how elements of 
despotic power are still applied when need be, e.g. when major general strikes have been 
threatened. The two policy cases do to a large extent support the conclusions from the historical 
analysis. In the cases of employment and integration policy, the state has been very active in 
regulating the corporatist system. The evidence from integration policy even shows how the state’s 
regulation efforts can result in a disintegration of corporatist relations. Whereas the integration 
policy area can mainly be seen as an example of Nordlinger’s first type of autonomy (more despotic 
power), we see all three types of autonomy at play in the labour market arena. However, maybe 
slightly surprisingly, we see a tendency towards a shift from the second and the third type to the 
first type after the introduction of the reform. Although we have only studied two policy areas, both 
of them indicate a strengthening of the despotic power of the state. 
 One could argue that our state-centred approach has determined the way we have told 
the story of “the Danish model”. As indicated in the introduction, other scholars have also related 
the tale without using the state as a crucial actor (Due et. al. 1993; Jørgensen, 2002). Each story 
emphasizes a different facet of the more comprehensive narrative. Our intention in this article has 
been to highlight an aspect which has been somewhat neglected in earlier research.  
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i The research for this article was conducted in 2003-2005 as a part of the EU-sponsored project ’A Framework for 
Socio-Economic Development in Europe? The Consensual political Cultures of the Small West European States in 
Comparative and Historical Perspective (No. HPSE-CT-2002-00134) 
ii The term model implies that it can be imitated. Since each and every state structure and form of effective corporatism 
has developed along a unique different historical path and is based upon a specific composition of elements embedded 
in a specific historical context it is difficult to transfer institutional practices from one state and society to another. 
Consequently, we do not think this is the case with the so-called Danish Model. 
iii So far Mann will agree with Nordlinger. Mann’s conception of the state is a more encompassing one. Nordlinger has 
a more narrow focus. 
iv We are not entirely convinced that Nordlinger escapes the problem of reductionism and therefore he might not be 
capable of operating with a concept of the state which actually allows the state to be autonomous – and not only 
‘relative autonomous’. However, the way he differentiates between various forms of autonomy is useful for our purpose 
and the Nordlinger conceptualization of autonomy is a part of our framework. 
v Further reading on the Danish state formation process, see Kaspersen 2004; 2006; Kaspersen & Ottesen 2001. 
vi The “right of concatenation” involves linking the labour market’s many and different agreements together to form an 
aggregate conciliation proposal, so that in the first instance all trade unions and employer organizations had to vote in 
favour of the proposal, which otherwise lapsed. At the second stage joint voting was established for all areas covered by 
agreements, so that an aggregate majority in favour of the proposal meant adoption for all, even though some separate 
areas might have a majority against the proposal (Due et. al 1993: 498f). 
vii Our analysis and conclusions are based upon interviews with key persons within the two areas in 2003 and 2004 (see 
attached list of interviewed persons. 
viii The level of unemployment actually continued to rise up through the 1980’s. In 1973 the level was app. 1 %, in 1975 
app. 5 %, in 1983 app. 10,5 % and in 1993 app. 12 % (Rasmussen, 2000) 
ix The National Employment Council is an advisory board to the Government. 
x x We conducted interviews with the chairman of the committee, the representative from the Government (who was 
also leader of the secretariat of the committee), the representatives from the major employer and employee 
organizations (DA and LO), representatives from two smaller organizations on both sides (The Danish Confederation of 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Professional Associations and The Danish Association of Managers and Executives) and one of the independent 
experts. 
xi Prior to the Labour Market Reform the unemployed had the right to re-qualify for entitlement to unemployment 
benefits by participation in an activation offer. After the reform this right was abolished. 
xii This description of the purpose of the Zeuthen Committee was given in an interview with the leader of the secretariat 
Jørgen Rosted. 
xiii Local Government Denmark is the association of municipalities in Denmark. The municipalities have relative 
independence form the central government with regards to taxation and service production. The central government 
does, however, set the boundaries within which the municipalities can act independently. 
xiv Refugees and immigrants mainly live in the large cities and municipalities around Copenhagen. Especially among 
mayors of these municipalities the discontent with the distribution of immigrants and refugees was widespread. These 
mayors were mainly social democrats. 
xv The immigrant organizations in Denmark are quite heterogeneous and the two attempts to make umbrella 
organizations have experienced a number of problems. The first organization IND-Sam was founded in 1981 but closed 
down in January 2003 because the organization’s accounts were in a mess, which resulted in removal of all state 
subsidies. In 1993 POEM was founded after a number of immigrant organizations disagreed with the leadership of 
IND-Sam. POEM has also led a somewhat chaotic life, but it does, however, still exist after some turbulent years 
(Mikkelsen 2003:113f; Hammer & Bruun 2000:68ff) 
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